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Apparently conflicting statements like the following make it difficult to 
determine the nature of Hume's concept of self: 
It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or 
from any other, that the idea of the self is derived; and 
consequently there is no such idea.1 
According as our idea of ourself is more or less 
advantageous, we feel either of those opposite affections, 
and are elated by pride, or dejected with humility.2 
Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of 
ourselves is always intimately present with us...3 
By exploring these claims in their contexts we may be able to 
assemble a more thoroughgoing account of Hume's concept of self than 
he presents in any one discussion. Although such a view may provide 
valuable insights when brought to Hume's troubled treatment of personal 
identity, that "abstruser science" is not at the heart of this paper. Indeed, 
in what follows I will argue that Hume rejects a certain notion of personal 
identity while preserving the kind of self-awareness upon which it claimed 
to rest. 
When Hume discusses personal identity in the first book of the 
Treatise, he insists that there is no such thing as an "impression or idea of 
the self." But these same phrases appear later when he explains the 
workings of human passions-especially those of pride and humility. What 
are we to make of this apparent inconsistency? The easiest course is one 
which shares a measure of kinship with other important treatments of 
Hume—remove the qualification "apparent". Perhaps Hume has 
contradicted himself. A more conciliatory approach could pursue the 
suggestion that there is more to learn about the self than we find in the 
Book I discussions devoted to its rejection. For example, we might become 
convinced that Hume's discussion of the passions indirectly contributes to 
1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Nidditch 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 252. 
2 Ibid., p. 277. 
3 Ibid., p. 317. 
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his account of the self in such a way as to dispel the apparent inconsistency 
of the passages cited above. 
While I believe that Hume's later discussions do reveal additional 
and important features of his concept of self, 1 hope to show that both of 
the above views are implausible. If I am correct, the appearance of 
inconsistency is an unfortunate result of Hume's use of similar 
terminology in referring to two very different features of the self. One of 
these features, a proposed version of personal identity, Hume firmly 
rejects. The other feature involves a notion of self-awareness which is 
crucial to his account of human nature. As we will see, Hume explicitly 
reassigns his terms, withdrawing them from what he rejects while applying 
them to what he preserves, but the reassignment is not prominent enough 
to prevent misunderstanding. Where Hume treats differently various 
topics concerning the self, his reuse of certain phrases creates the 
appearance of contradiction. If we first consider some weaknesses in the 
assertion that Hume has genuinely contradicted himself, we can gather 
the patience to explore my claim in more detail. 
Certainly nothing should prevent us from accusing Hume of 
contradicting himself on trivial or isolated points. But when we see both 
how varied and how extensive is Hume's concern with the self, we must 
realize that a genuine contradiction here would deeply disrupt his account 
of human nature. Preserving such a verdict as a last resort, we ought to 
heed Hume's warning against considering all statements about the self in 
the same light. 
...we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it 
regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our 
passions or the concern we take in ourselves.4 
Although we shall find this distinction far from unproblematical, 
statements like this one caution us against insisting that every mention of 
the self be consistent with Hume's initial discussion of personal identity. 
Our caution is supported in a less explicit way by Hume's famous 
recantation of his discussion of personal identity. In the appendix of the 
Treatise, Hume acknowledges that something is amiss in his treatment of 
the topic. 
...I find myself involved in such a labyrinth, that, I must 
confess, I neither know how to correct my former 
opinions, nor how to render them consistent.5 
4 Ibid., p. 253. cf.,p.261. 
5 Ibid., p. 633. 
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Although Hume thus leaves issues of personal identity unresolved, he 
neither questions nor retracts anything concerning his employment of the 
concept of self from his later discussion of the passions. We will see that 
what he does not reject, neither in the early attack on personal identity, nor 
in the recantation, is precisely that to which he assigns a crucial role in his 
later discussions of the passions. For the time being, the fact that some 
Treatise discussions employing the "idea and impression of self remain 
immune to his recantation strengthens the view that Hume uses these 
phrases in what he takes to be consistent ways. 
A more general consideration which might lend auxiliary support to 
the above points involves the way in which Hume derives reinforcement 
for his account of the understanding from his later account of the passions. 
What is principally remarkable in this whole affair is the 
strong confirmation these phaenomena give to the 
foregoing system concerning the understanding, and 
consequently to the present one concerning the 
passions; since these are analogous to each other.6 
The idea and the impression of self are indispensable components of 
pride and humility, and they play a role in the functioning of sympathy. If 
from his account of these passions he garners support for his earlier 
discussions of the understanding, then he in some measure relies on the 
'idea and impression of the self to bolster the very reasoning which earlier 
led him to reject the meaningfulness of these same phrases. Either Hume 
has more than one use for these terms, or the "strong confirmation" that 
he relishes is actually a broad inconsistency.7 
The above reflections show that if we pursue the implications of the 
accusation of contradiction, we find Hume suffering from a much more 
extensive and damaging confusion than the accusation initially claims. 
We should first consider how his different and seemingly conflicting 
discussions of self might be compatible. Let us proceed to examine each 
of Hume's treatments of self in order to determine the nature of their 
relationship. 
6 Ibid., p. 319. cf.,p.289. 
7 Another point, (albeit a highly speculative one), which might suggest that 
Hume meant to entertain different but compatible notions of self arises 
from the kind of support which he does not try to garner from his account 
of the passions. If the idea of the self employed in later sections is the 
same one which earlier proved an inadequate basis for a theory of 
personal identity, then why did Hume not try to derive personal identity 
from pride and humility? For example, would it not, on those assumptions, 
be possible to isolate the self by focusing more closely on the object of 
pride? 
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In his section on personal identity, Hume briefly characterizes a 
Cartesian view of personal identity. According to some philosophers, we 
are always and intimately aware of an identical and simple self. Instead of 
distracting our attention from this self, sensations and passions only 
increase the intensity of this awareness. Hume proceeds to attack these 
"positive assertions" from two directions. First, we simply do not have the 
described experience of self. Secondly, there could be no perception of 
self of the kind required for such an experience. We neither have nor 
could have such a "self." 
The relationship between these two objections is open to several 
interpretations. In opposition to a position taken by Saul Traiger, I do not 
take these objections to be distinct attacks on distinct philosophical views.8 
Rather, I read the two attacks as complementary attempts to undermine a 
single Cartesian theory of personal identity. Hume attacks not two distinct 
views, but a conclusion as well as the reasoning which leads to it. 
Concerning the Cartesian self he asks, 
...from what impression cou'd this idea be deriv'd? This 
question 'tis impossible to answer without a manifest 
contradiction and absurdity...9 
By "absurdity" I take Hume to be rejecting a conclusion which is ridiculous 
in its own right and which has been reached by reasoning which involves "a 
manifest contradiction".10 
The latter objection follows from Hume's empiricist account of the 
origin of ideas. There could be no such idea of self because no possible 
impression could give rise to it. If any impression gives rise to the idea of 
self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro' the whole 
course of our lives, since self is suppos'd to exist after that manner. But 
there is no impression constant and invariable.11 
The last sentence in the above quoted passage is not an empirical 
report—it is the restatement of a conclusion reached earlier. Our 
impressions are constantly changing. What we conceive of as strict 
identity is actually a confusion which arises when we perceive an object 
which remains invariable and uninterrupted over a supposed variation in 
time. Of course anything that could count as an indication of passing time, 
such as the ticking of a clock or the lengthening of a shadow, would 
8 Saul Traiger, "Hume on Finding an Impression the Self," 
Hume Studies Vol. XI, No. 1 (April 1985): 47-68. 
9 Treatise., p. 251. 
1 0 I am not convinced by Traiger's brief survey of Hume's use of the words 
"contradiction" and "absurdity" that they are both being used to 
characterize the same thing. 
11 Treatise., p. 251. 
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invalidate the claim that the impression had remained the same. We 
would instead have a succession of perceptions related to each other by a 
strong resemblance. The succession of passions and sensations which 
Cartesians claim serve to intensify our awareness of self could only really 
serve to invalidate the selfs identity. Further, since the required 
impression would not cease during one's life, it could not give rise to a 
complete idea—in this case, one could only think about one's self once the 
impression of self had ceased, that is, once the person had expired.1 2 
Hume's other objection, that we in fact have no experience of such a 
self, is easily misconstrued. He says, 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call 
myself, I always stumble on some particular perception 
or other... I can never catch myself at any time without a 
perception, and never can observe anything but the 
perception. When my perceptions are removed for any 
time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of 
myself, and may truly be said not to exist.1 3 
Introspection leads not to a discovery of a self, but of some particular, 
temporary perception. In the absence of all such perceptions, nothing at 
all indicates self-existence. Nevertheless, Hume's objection takes the 
form of an enquiry into what he calls "myself*. There is no "simple and 
continu'd" something waiting to be observed, but Hume says that it is only 
when his perceptions are removed that he becomes "insensible of myself. 
He can never catch himself without a perception, and the perception is all 
he observes, but these are only further details about what happens when 
he does "enter intimately" into himself, when he does in fact "catch 
himself. We can see that Hume is not denying that there is a meaningful 
use for the word "myself", only that it does not refer to the kind of thing 
which some philosophers claim it does. Aside from such 
"metaphysicians", the rest of us... 
...are nothing but a bundle or collection of different 
perceptions, which succeed each other with an 
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and 
movement.14 
1 2 I take the notion of an ever-present, unchanging impression to be a 
special case of a singular judgment of immediate perception, and I have 
here applied to it an idea developed more generally by David Pears in 
Hume's System, (see pp. 11,18.) 
1 3 Treatise., p. 252. 
1 4 Ibid. 
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Somewhat paradoxically, what is perpetual about what I call "myself is not 
some unchanging perception, but rather the flux and movement of the 
perceptions which are mine. 
Hume rejects a simple, individuatable, identifiable self, on several 
grounds, but he at no point rejects what I have been calling self-awareness. 
Hume is aware of himself, does "enter into" himself, but this awareness is 
not of some object, but rather of rapidly changing perceptions. With 
Descartes, Hume can say, "I am; I exist," but he adamantly rejects the 
reification of that awareness—he refuses to say, "I am a thinking thing." 
Not only is there no empirical basis for the "absurd" claim of an enduring, 
unchanging thing which thinks, but the very reasoning which begins from 
an awareness of perpetual flux and leads to the positing of an enduring 
entity involves a "manifest contradiction." 
So far I have been attempting to show that, despite appearances, 
Hume has not ruled out meaningful talk about the self-only such talk 
about a self conceived in a certain way. But showing that meaningful talk 
about the self is not wholly ruled out is far from showing that contradictory 
statements about it do not actually conflict. Hume has energetically 
argued that there are no 'impressions or ideas of the self,' yet he later 
employs these very phrases. What is required is a demonstration that 
Hume has reassigned these troublesome phrases to what can still be 
meaningfully said about the self, and that in his subsequent use of them 
he wishes only to express these preserved meanings. 
I have maintained that Hume allows for self-awareness yet rejects the 
possibility of basing a theory of personal identity upon this awareness.15 If 
Hume has reassigned phrases like "idea of the self" and found a 
meaningful way to talk about our "intimate awareness of ourselves" then 
he must now be referring to the self-awareness he leaves intact. He 
spends the latter portion of his section on personal identity explaining our 
irresistable propensity to ascribe identity to what self-awareness shows us, 
to our "bundle" of successive perceptions. 
Our ascription of self-identity is the result of the same mistakes and 
confusion that induces us to ascribe identity to any other object. The 
mental process involved in our observation of a succession of related 
objects is so much like that involved in our (supposed) observation of an 
invariable and uninterrupted object, that we easily mistake the one state of 
affairs for the other. 
1 5 For a brief and clear discussion of the relationship between self-
awareness and personal identity, see The Character of Mind, by Colin 
McGinn. ' 7 
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This resemblance is the cause of the confusion and 
mistake, and makes us substitute the notion of identity, 
instead of that of related objects.16 
In the end, our vigilance falters, and we assert that the related but different 
objects are actually the same. In order to justify and disguise this absurd 
ascription, we invent some principle which connects the obviously 
different perceptions. In the same way, when we turn our attention to 
"ourselves", we "feign the continu'd existence of the perceptions of our 
senses", and we disguise the misdeed with fictional notions like soul, self, 
substance, or even more bizarre adhesives. 
All ascriptions of identity are accompanied by some fiction, but not all 
fictions are as undesirable as the metaphysical entities just mentioned. 
When we ascribe identity to trees, houses, rivers, republics, and other such 
"compounded and changeable productions" we do not assert that they 
possess selves or souls, or that their parts are connected by a common 
substance. The ideas of the various and successive parts of such things 
provoke our ascription of identity by resembling and causing each other. 
So too with the self. The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is 
only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to 
vegetables and animal bodies. 1 7 
It is quite acceptable to call that set of constantly (and dramatically) 
changing perceptions which I frequently encounter in my front garden, "a 
tree". Further, 1 can talk about perceiving that tree even while admitting 
that the physical matter out of which it is composed is constantly being 
replaced. Nor is there any "breach of the propriety of language" when I 
observe, "our tree is losing many of its leaves in this wind", even though I 
tacitly ascribe identity to something which is changing before my eyes. 
By comparing the kind of identity which we ascribe to the mind to that 
which we ascribe to things like trees, Hume opens up possibilities for 
talking about the "idea of the self without running afoul of his attacks 
against the Cartesian conception of personal identity. The self is not a 
simple, durable, invariable entity which is at all times present to our mind's 
eye—it is never really anything other than a bundle or succession of 
related perceptions. We are irresistibly inclined to ascribe a sort of 
fictional unity to our perceptions because they are related in ways which 
allow them to pass seamlessly before the mind. We need metaphysical 
entities neither to give rise to, nor to justify our conception of a tree, a river, 
or ourself. Our awareness of such things allows us to talk and think of 
them even though they do not come close to meeting the conditions of 
strict identity. 
1 6 Ibid., p. 254. 
1 7 Ibid., p. 259. 
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This comparison clears the way for Hume's later employment of the 
impression and idea of the self when he describes the operations of the 
passions. If we examine some of those later passages we will indeed find 
that Hume now uses these terms to refer to the continuous flux of 
perceptions which, as we have seen, allows for self-awareness but which 
cannot ground personal identity. 
In the opening paragraphs of Hume's discussion of pride and 
humility, we find him explicitly assigning a new meaning to the word "self. 
T i s evident, that pride and humility, tho* directly 
contrary, have yet the same OBJECT. This object is self, 
or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of 
which we have intimate memory and consciousness.18 
In these few lines Hume allows the self to enjoy a sort of unity while 
making it clear that this "object" is actually a succession of perceptions. 
This is the self of self-awareness which remains after the Cartesian self has 
been dissolved. This is the self of which we may have perceptions. Hume 
asserts. 
Here the view always fixes when we are actuated by 
either of these passions. According as our idea of ourself 
is more or less advantageous, we feel either of those 
opposite affections...19 
In order for our idea of self to serve as the object of these passions, Hume 
requires only that it be available to awareness, not that it satisfy strict 
identity conditions. Indeed, the possibility that one could have a "more or 
less advantageous" idea of one's self seems to require that the self not 
remain unchanged. If, as Hume asserts, "Tis impossible a man can at the 
same time be both proud and humble...", then it would seem to follow that 
an invariable self would be forever stuck with one or the other (or neither). 
The self we possess is obviously not the Cartesian "thinking thing," but 
can it pass the tests that the Cartesian self failed? If Hume is justified in 
using the word "idea" here, then in accordance with his empiricist principle 
we should be able to locate the impression from which it arose. Since the 
idea now under consideration need not remain constant nor invariable, 
our search is not defeated a priori by the conditions of identity. But if our 
idea of self involves an awareness of a rapidly flowing stream of 
impressions to which we fictitiously ascribe unity, do we have here an 
instance of a single idea which is not derived from a single impression? 
Perhaps we have—but perhaps this is not a problem. We would simply 
1 8 Ibid., p. 277. 
1 9 Ibid. 
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need to allow that several impressions, even a continuous stream of 
impressions, could contribute to what is, for all intents and purposes, one 
idea. 2 0 This is not what Hume does suggest. In fact, he invokes the 
impression of the self without indicating that he finds any difficulty 
concerning it. 
Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of 
ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that 
our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our 
own person, that it is not possible to imagine, that any 
thing can in this particular go beyond it. 2 1 
Perhaps the impression that Hume mentions here is an impression of 
reflection, one derived from, rather than giving rise to, the idea of the self. 
Perhaps Hume, in his re-application of the terms 'idea' and 'impression' is 
somewhat less inclined to hold to his empiricist doctrine. Whatever the 
explanation, I must for the time being leave the question open. 
Above I have been concerned to show that Hume's statements about 
the self only apparently contradict each other. Since his treatments of self 
play such important roles in his explication of human nature, we should 
resist the urge to accuse him of inconsistency. If I am right, the way to 
reconcile his almost diametrically opposed statements is to interpret his 
early treatment of the self as a course of reasoning designed to separate 
self-awareness from personal identity, to reject the latter, and to preserve 
the former. It is a difficult interpretation because it is difficult to 
determine just what it is about the Cartesian conception of self that Hume 
finds objectionable. Finally, two things force Hume to reject that Cartesian 
view. First, it conflicts with our experience-we possess no ever-present, 
simple self. Secondly, though based on a sort of awareness which we do 
have, it illegitimately posits a metaphysical entity, a strictly identifiable 
self. 
That Cartesian view represents a surrender to the temptation arising 
from the peculiarly smooth passage of the many different impressions of 
which we are at each moment aware. Like the Cartesians, we would posit 
metaphysical entities in order to justify our too-rigid reification of 
awareness. It is not surprising then, that Hume's later description of the 
self, which preserves the awareness at the foundation of the Cartesian 
view, uncannily resembles the views which he seemed to reject so 
2 0 And perhaps such an allowance would also help us to explain the 
famous "blue-gap" example. We might suggest that the impressions of 
the two shades of blue bordering on the gap could contribute or be 
combined into one idea, thus providing an idea of the missing shade, (see 
pp. 5-6 in the Treatise.) 
21 Ibid., p. 317. 
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enthusiastically. In fact, that primal self-awareness is an essential feature 
of human nature since it plays a pivotal role in the operation of the 
passions. We do grant a certain unity to the succession of perceptions 
which passes before us, but it is a fictitious unity which is neither 
consciously ascribed nor supportive of a theory of personal identity. 
Once Hume has rejected the Cartesian version of personal identity, 
he is left with its former foundation-self-awareness. In discussing that 
awareness, he rejuvenates some of the very same phrases which were 
earlier attached to the rejected personal identity. Hume's failure to justify 
or even explain his rejuvenation, indeed, his failure to pick new terms, 
causes an unfortunate appearance of contradiction-he seems to deny and 
affirm the existence of ideas and impressions of the self. However, a 
careful look at the relationship between what Hume throws out and what 
he keeps, at his separation of self-awareness and personal identity, reveals 
a fairly consistent, naturalistic concept of self.^2 
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